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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to share lessons learnt during the intervention in the Eastern Cape provincial 
department of housing by the National department, to upscale the delivery of housing in the province. 
This is a case study approach focusing on the housing delivery system in the Eastern Cape. The 
researcher being a member of the intervention team observed, intervened and reported on progress 
achieved by the intervention. It was found that: (1) to build capacity to improve the performance of an 
institution requires a look at individual capacity, institutional capacity and environmental capacity; (2) any 
intervention in a system must be preceded by a diagnostic phase; (3) for any intervention in a human 
system, change management is critical and lastly, that worker engagement and empowerment is critical. 
The delivery of housing in South Africa is marred by what is perceived as ‘lack of capacity’. This paper will 
enhance the ability of government to intervene where there is under-performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Eastern Cape had a declining performance in housing delivery and the expenditure thereof over a 
period of three years (Figure 1), resulting in the National Department withdrawing R350 million from the 
Eastern Cape’s 2006/7 housing budget and R500 million from 2007/8 housing budget (DHS, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Housing delivery prior to the intervention 
 
 
It was clear before the beginning of the new financial year (2008/9) that the planned housing delivery 
outputs by the Eastern Cape for 2008/09 financial year included 18 000 houses and 21 000 serviced 
stands, which was slightly more than the actual delivery in 2007/08. The practicality of up-scaling delivery 
from 12 000 units delivered in the 2007/08 financial year to 18 000 units in the 2008/9 financial year, 
implied more than a doubling of expenditure and output by the Province. This up-scaling was against the 
backdrop of declining housing delivery output over the past four (4) years. Some assessments by the 
National Department of Housing, of the readiness of the projects to yield the 18 000 units revealed that 
the province was very likely going to only spend 65% of their budget allocation. It was clear that to arrest 
the decline in housing delivery in the Eastern Cape Province, some interventions were necessary.  The 
National cabinet took a decision on the 16th of April 2008 to invoke section 100 (1) (a) of the Constitution 
and that the then National Department of housing provides support to the Province in terms of section 3 
(2) (d) of the Housing Act (DHS, 2008).  
 
 
2. STATUS-QUO ANALYSIS & FINDINGS 
 
In order to give effect to the National Cabinet decision, to invoke section 100 (1) (a) for the National 
Department of housing to provide support to the Eastern Cape Province,  a Joint intervention team 
comprised of both the National department of housing and Provincial department of housing officials was 
established. The team was divided into four operational streams, namely: (1) Project Implementation 
stream, (2) Organisational design and HR stream, (3) Financial Management stream, and (4) Back-Office 
/ Administrative support stream. The choice and the number of streams was premised on the team’s 
understanding that organizational capacity includes both individual, organizational and environmental 
capacities, in other words, the team must be able to assess both the individual capacities in terms of 
competencies required by the department and available competencies; organizational capacities in terms 
of both strategies, structure, processes, systems and culture; as well as environmental capacities in terms 
of the availability of construction material, housing beneficiaries, construction contractors, construction 
labourers and the political will. 
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To kick-start the intervention, the intervention team agreed on the approach as outlined below: (1) 
conducting an  “AS-IS” analysis; (2) identify required interventions; (3) determine resources required to 
design and/or implement interventions; (4) source resources to design and/or implement interventions; (5) 
implementation of interventions; (6) evaluate the impact of implemented interventions; and (7) exit the 
province.  
 
2.1 Status-quo analysis 
 
It was agreed that interventions will be preceded by an “AS-IS” (status-quo) analysis of the situation in the 
Eastern Cape department of housing. It was further agreed that each of the streams mentioned above will 
conduct an “AS-IS” analysis and report to the Intervention Manager and the team to inform further 
actions. Each stream held meetings with relevant officials of the Provincial department of housing to 
conduct an “AS-IS” analysis to pinpoint both strengths and areas of improvement in the department to 
inform the type of intervention support required for the Eastern Cape Housing department. The following 
findings were reported by each stream: 
 
2.1.1 Organisational development & Human Resources stream 
Based on the OD theory, for an organization to achieve its objectives, there need to be congruency 
between the organisation’s strategy, organizational structure, organizational processes and systems, 
people and the organizational culture. The organizational development and Human resources stream 
therefore conducted a status-quo analysis to determine the following: (1) the delineation process of the 
Department of housing, local government and traditional affairs that lead to the establishment of a “stand-
alone” department of housing, to determine whether all relevant legislative requirements were satisfied; 
(2) the Organisational structure of the department to determine whether it was aligned to the department’s 
mandate/strategy, and whether it provided for an optimum number of posts for the department to achieve 
its mandates; (3) whether  job evaluation was used to determine the grades of positions in the 
Organisational structure; (4) the number of vacant posts in the organizational structure; (5) the availability 
of relevant Human Resources policies and the implementation thereof; (6) the competencies of the 
incumbents if the filled posts, and (7) the availability of and implementation of a performance 
management system. 
 
Findings: The Organisational development stream reported the following as areas of concern: (1) that 
the delineation process that lead to the establishment of the department of housing was conducted in line 
with relevant public service prescripts such as the Public service regulations, Public service act etc.; (2) 
that the department did not have relevant Human Resources Management policies; (3) that the 
organizational structure was developed in line with guidelines by the DPSA and approved accordingly, by 
the relevant authorities; (4) that only 198 posts (22%) out of a total of 903 posts in the organizational 
structure were filled; (5) that positions in the new structure were not job evaluated to determine 
appropriate grades for the positions; (6) that the incumbent of the position of Senior Manager Human 
resources management was new in the department (less than 3 months in the department), and was 
occupied with trying to fill as much vacant positions as possible, and did not have time to develop relevant 
Human resources management policies; (7) that there was no Performance management system in 
place; (8) that the office accommodation was a problem (more than one Senior manager and their 
Personnel Assistants shared offices); and (9) that the function of Project management was outsourced 
and performed by contracted project managers. 
 
 
2.1.2 Finance Management stream 
The Finance Management stream of the Intervention Team conducted Status-Quo analysis to determine 
the intervention/s required focusing on the following: (1) the budget formulation to ascertain whether the 
budget is aligned to the organisational structure and in line with relevant prescripts such as the Division of 
revenue act (Dora); (2) the setting up and functionality of systems such as BAS and PERSAL; (3) the 
capacity of the department to perform Budget planning and monitoring activities; (4) the capacity of the 
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department to perform grant management and procurement activities; (5) the availability and 
implementation of financial management policies; and (6) the capacity of the department to perform the 
following critical financial management activities:- Internal control and anti-corruption activities; Internal 
audit/risk management activities; Financial administration; and Management of municipality trust 
accounts. 
 
 
Findings: The Finance stream reported the following as areas of concern: (1) misalignment of regional 
budget allocation to delivery outputs; (2) cash flow projections which were not linked to project 
performance; (3) budget held up in blocked or slow moving projects; (4) unspent monies in municipal trust 
accounts; (5) inadequate in-year and multi-year budgeting; (6) payments to provincial agencies prior to 
delivery of outputs (pre-payments/ advances); (7) inconsistency between budgets allocated and actual 
spend; and (8) inefficient payment claims management process system. 
 
 
2.1.3 Housing subsidy system (HSS) and back office stream 
During the Status-quo analysis phase, the Housing Subsidy System and back office team assessed the 
following to inform targeted interventions: (1) the capacity of the department to utilise the Housing subsidy 
system (HSS); (2) the capacity of the department to perform and manage ICT activities; (3) the availability 
of adequate office space for the department; and (4) the department’s capacity to interpret policies. 
 
Findings: The Housing subsidy stream reported the following as areas of concern: (1) that the 
department did not have sufficient capacity to operate the Housing subsidy system; (2) that the 
department did not have sufficient capacity to perform Information and Communication technology (ICT) 
functions due to vacant posts in the organizational structure; (3) that the department did not have enough 
office accommodation to accommodate the few filled posts; and (4) that there were few officials who 
could interpret policies. 
 
2.1.4 Projects implementation stream 
In order for the Intervention Team to focus on the expected results, i.e. to upscale housing delivery and 
the expenditure thereof, the team prioritised the Project implementation component of the intervention to 
ensure that the decline in housing delivery and the resultant decline in the financial expenditure were 
addressed as a matter of urgency. To achieve the above, the National department of Housing deployed 
the Project Implementation stream team to be based in the Eastern Cape from mid-June 2008, (when 
members of the other three (3) streams would only visit the province for meetings) to conduct an 
assessment to pinpoint areas of concern to inform the development of intervention solutions. An initial 
assessment of the provincial department’s 2008/9 financial year housing business plan reflected amongst 
others the following shortcomings, which lead to the plan being not credible: 
• unrealistic delivery targets; 
• cash-flow projections not always linked to actual projects; 
• projects planned on the basis of untested/ unverified assumptions; 
• multiple and irregular policy deviations and/or misinterpretations; 
• project plans lacking in infrastructure provision; 
• no alignment between planned projects, policy speech and  business plan; 
o project announced during policy speech not ready for implementation; 
o cash-flow requests not based on do-able projects; 
o funding allocated to projects whose readiness was not tested. 
 
Other areas of concern that required to be addressed through appropriate interventions besides the 
above, were the following: Inadequate Contractor capacity; Inadequate Project /Contractor management; 
Slow Pace of decision-making within the department’s administration; Shortage of construction material 
due to the rural-ness of the province; Inappropriate Housing Delivery Model (e.g. municipalities assuming 
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developer role whereas they did not have the capacity); Inadequate planning frameworks & processes; 
Unavailability of well-located land; Lack of bulk infrastructure; Poor admin & financial management  
systems; Lengthy procurement processes; Slow process for project and funding approval; Beneficiary 
Administration (houses built without approval of beneficiaries affecting delivery including payment of 
contractors); Lack of capacity for Municipal Trust accounts administration; Poor quality assurance due to 
NHBRC weaknesses; Contractor appointment based on pricing and not functionality, leading to prolonged 
processes and low quality; and Lack of adequate systems to review and disqualification on non-
performing contractors. 
 
 
3. INTERVENTIONS BASE ON THE RESULTS OF THE STATUS-QUO ANALYSIS 
 
In the first year a lot of the Intervention team resources and time was deployed to deal with actual 
projects performance and expenditure, whereas in the second year focus shifted to the whole housing 
delivery value chain. Focus was on the whole housing delivery value chain in order to create long-term 
sustainability in human settlement development. While the other streams where focusing on assisting the 
provincial departments develop and implement appropriate financial and human resources policies, 
systems and processes, a decision was taken for the Project Management Stream to identify projects to 
be fast-tracked.  
 
3.1 Assessing the readiness of individual projects for implementation 
  
In July 2008 after the abovementioned initial assessment (status-quo analysis), the project 
implementation stream decided to drill down into the project landscape in order to ensure a targeted 
approach to the development and implementation of intervention solutions. The officials of the Provincial 
department supplied the National Intervention Team with a huge number of projects (303 projects) which 
were described as either running, slow moving, or blocked. The number of projects per region is tabulated 
below: 
 
 
Area Total Projects Total Units Average units 
per project 
Ukhahlamba District 12 2 623 219 
Chris Hani District 33 3 523 107 
Cacadu District  61 5 738 94 
Amathole District  78 2 100 27 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 71 7 257 102 
OR Tambo District  40 2 100 53 
Alfred Nzo District 8 1 100 138 
TOTAL 
 
303 
 
24 446  
81 
Table: 1 2008/9 EC PHD housing projects 
 
The National Team lead by Mr. Leshabe Rampedi, seconded Head of department (HoD) for the 
Department of Local government and housing in Limpopo, assembled a team of officials, to conduct a 
rapid project appraisal in order to assess the readiness of each of the 303 projects, for implementation 
and completion within the project agreed completion time. In their assessment of the readiness of each 
project the team visited the six (6) regions of the Eastern Cape i.e. Cacadu district, Alfred Nzo district, 
Amathole district, Chris Hani district, Ukhahlamba district, and OR Tambo district, to meet with the 
Provincial department’s Senior Regional Managers, to discuss each of the 303 projects. The Project 
implementation Stream Lead (Mr. Rampedi) emphasized that project verification/readiness assessment is 
not an end in itself since it is only one of the tactics to achieve the strategy/goal. He encouraged 
members to focus on the results of the intervention, i.e. upscaling housing delivery in terms of units 
delivered and expenditure thereof. He further emphasized that strategy supersedes tactics, in his 
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attempts to ensure that the team does not only identify blockages in projects and not provide solutions to 
address the identified blockages and challenges.  
 
 
 
3.2 Identifying administrative blockages 
 
During the exercise to assess the readiness of projects, it was discovered that some of the projects were 
blocked or running slow due to administrative challenges that if resolved could unblock the projects or 
increase the pace of project implementation. Most of the administrative blockages entailed 
submissions/memorandums to seek approval from the Head of Department or the political head (MEC). 
Most of the blockages did not need technical capacity to unblock, but needed the department to fast-track 
the performance of certain administrative activities to get the projects moving.  
 
3.3 Identification of Flagship projects  
 
As indicated above, the intervention team was supplied with a huge number of projects which were 
described as either running, slow moving, or blocked. As indicated in Table 1 above, the total number of 
projects were 303, to yield 24 446 units at an average of only 81 units per project. The intervention team 
decided that 303 projects at an average rate of 81 units per project were spreading the resources of the 
department too wide and thin. Based on the 80/20 Pareto principle, the intervention team convinced the 
department’s MEC and the departmental management to select and focus on a limited number of projects 
that could deliver a significant number of units. There was therefore a need for the team to identify 
flagship projects. Flagship projects were those projects that if unblocked and/or fast-tracked would have a 
huge impact on service delivery and budget spending during the financial year under review. One of the 
criteria to select these projects in terms of unit numbers was that each project would yield around 500 
units. The team was also mindful of the fact that (1) each of the Eastern Cape regions should have a 
number of flagship projects to ensure equitable delivery of housing and (2) ensure that the overall human 
settlement delivery system improves, and becomes sustainable in the medium term to long term and also 
ensure that the process to plan for the following years projects are underway. Twenty four (24) projects 
with the potential to yield 15 000 units were subsequently identified, discussed with the departmental 
management teams and subsequently approved by the MEC. The number of projects per district is 
indicated hereunder. 
 
 
District/Area 
 
Number of projects 
 
Units 
Nelson Mandela 7 5 904 
Chris Hani 2 2 404 
Cacadu 9 3 987 
Buffalo City 3 1 974 
Alfred Nzo 1   500 
Ukhahlamba 2   597 
TOTALS 24 15 856 by R50 000 equal 
R790m 
Table 2: Number of Flagship projects  
 
 
For each Flagship project the Intervention team identified issues/blockages that needed to be resolved to 
speed-up delivery. It was decided that these 15 000 houses can only be achieved if planning and 
administrative blockages are removed, project implementation plans are developed, and that such plans 
are part of contracts to be signed between whoever is the developer and the individual contractors. This 
unblocking was to have happened by the end of August 2008 so that from September onwards focus 
would be on supporting the actual housing construction. It should be mentioned that in some instances 
some projects had no contractors appointed. 
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3.4 Deployment of Engineers and other technical staff to Flagship Projects   
 
In September 2008 the National Intervention Team deployed Engineers and Town Planners, Construction 
Project Managers in the Eastern Cape regions. These Engineers and technical resources were deployed 
to perform functions to ensure the up-scaling of housing delivery in the Eastern Cape. They were also 
expected to transfer skills and knowledge to provincial officials in their areas of deployment. These 
deployees provided progress reports to the Project Implementation Stream lead and the provincial 
department’s Senior Regional managers on a weekly basis.  
 
 
4. CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED DURING THE INTERVETION 
 
There was a high turnover of Engineers and Construction Project Managers deployed over the two year 
period and had to be replaced. Some were frustrated due to lack of cooperation from provincial officials 
and subsequently left. This led to an increased workload on the remaining Engineers. One of the causes 
of the challenge was the lack of a change management stream or sub-stream in the department and the 
Intervention team. According to Prosci, (2007), research shows that problems with the people dimension 
of change are the most commonly cited reasons for project failures. In a study with 248 companies, 
effective change management with employees was listed as one of the top-three overall success factors 
for the project. Helping managers to be effective sponsors of change was considered the most critical 
success factor. According to Kotter (1998), 70% of all major change efforts in organizations fail, because 
organizations often do not take the holistic approach required to see the change through. Effective 
management of the people dimension of change requires managing the following five key goals that form 
the basis of Prosci ADKAR model (2013):  
 
Goals Diagnostic questions 
Awareness of the need to change Do all stakeholders understand why the desired 
change is needed? (What will be the result of the 
transition?) 
Desire to participate and support the change Are all stakeholders motivated to make the 
desired change?  
Knowledge of how to change (and what the change 
looks like) 
Do all stakeholders know how make the desired 
change happen?  
Ability to implement the change on a day-to-day 
basis 
Were all stakeholders given the right information 
and training?  
Reinforcement to keep the change in place Is there a system of encouraging or keeping the 
change in place 
Table 4: ADKAR change management model  
 
 
Due to lack of change management during the intervention period, the intervention team was faced with 
resistance from most of the senior officials of the department who felt that they did not see the need for 
the intervention by the national department, despite the glaring evidence of the declining delivery of 
housing and non-expenditure of the housing development grant funds over a period of five years. This led 
to unnecessary tensions between members of the intervention team from the national department and 
senior officials of the provincial department.  
  
 
5. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERVETION 
 
The effectiveness of the intervention was judged in terms of the improvement in the delivery of housing 
and expenditure thereof, achieved by the end of the intervention in March 2010, compared to the number 
of houses constructed and expenditure thereof before the intervention at the end of the 2007 financial 
year. The number of houses and expenditure at the end of the intervention increase by 140% and 250% 
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respectively when compared to the 2007/8 financial year. The provincial department has spent its total 
budget for the first time in 5 years, due to the intervention. See Graphs 1 and 2 below for houses 
completed (excluding services) and the actual expenditure.   
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: E. Cape houses constructed from 2007/7 – 2009/10 financial years 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2: E. Cape expenditure from 2007/8 – 2009/10 financial years 
 
 
Besides the above indicators (graphs) demonstrating improved performance of the Eastern Cape 
Provincial department, the graph below demonstrate the improvement in performance of the provincial 
department relative to the other eight provinces in the country. Graph 3 below demonstrates the 
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percentage increase in expenditure over the last three years of the 9 provinces’ departments of housing. 
The Eastern Cape has been the best performer in this regard. 
 
 
Graph 3: Provincial departments of housing percentage increase in expenditure 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
As indicated above, the improvement in the number of houses completed and the expenditure of the 
housing development grant funds, demonstrate the effectiveness of the intervention team. The following 
are lessons learnt from the intervention: (1) the use of a Multi-disciplinary team that did not only focus on 
housing projects but acknowledged the department as a system comprised of a number of subsystems 
that includes people, processes, systems, organizational culture, etc. This has enabled the intervention 
team come up with interventions that targeted the work, worker and the work-place (IPSI, 2013). The 
team therefore took a systems viewpoint instead of focusing on one element of the department; (2) 
diagnosis-informed interventions ensured a targeted approach to addressing identified performance 
challenges, and this enhanced the effectiveness of the solutions; (3) co-designing solutions by the 
intervention team and officials of provincial departments was critical for the acceptance of solutions and 
the implementation thereof, this minimised resistance; (4) buy-in from leadership is critical to avoid 
resistance-leaders need to convinced that there is a need for a change before an intervention could be 
commenced, therefore change management need to be part of the intervention activities; (5) the 
credibility of members of the intervention team in terms of their qualifications, experience, skills and 
knowledge is critical to enhance the acceptability of the team; (6) transfer of skills and knowledge to 
officials of the provincial department by members of the intervention team is critical to enhance the 
sustainability of the delivery levels achieve during the intervention; and lastly, that performance 
improvement interventions should be created through a process involving analysis, design, development, 
implementation, and evaluation (Molenda, 2003).  
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